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
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
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




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# AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

## STUDENT REPORT

BOOK ANALYSIS: THE STRAW GIANT

MAJOR ALBERT S. TORIGIAN 88-2580

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## PREFACE

The Straw Giant, by Arthur T. Hadley, was chosen for a book analysis because it appears to be a straightforward and objective examination of the problems and military failures that have occurred under this country's defense system. Hadley provides an interesting explanation for these problems by attributing them to six recurring themes or faults. Hadley also provides solutions or reforms to address the faults. This author was interested to know if these faults would prove to be correct and significant under independent analysis and if Hadley's solutions could adequately address the faults.

Therefore, this book analysis attempts to determine if these themes exist, if they are significant, and if they have played a major part in our military failures. This analysis also examines Hadley's solutions to determine if they address the faults adequately and are practical to implement. The themes and faults are corroborated or refuted based on the writings of experts in the field. To that end this paper is organized as follows:

Chapter One is a synopsis of The Straw Giant to give the reader a full appreciation of the scope of this book.

Chapter Two examines author Hadley to determine his credibility based on his education, training, and experience.

Chapter Three examines the six themes by first stating Hadley's explanation and support and then analyzes those themes. Conclusions are provided at the end of the chapter.

Chapter Four examines Hadley's reforms by first stating his position and support and then analyzes those reforms. Conclusions are also provided at the end of the chapter.

Finally, Chapter Five provides an overall conclusion of the analysis on Hadley's themes and reforms and includes a recommendation as to the book's use.

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Albert S. Torigian is a Developmental Engineering Officer, currently attending the Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He began his Air Force career in 1974 at Lackland Military Training Center, attending Officer Training School. After a brief tour at Chanute Military Training Center, he became a Maintenance Officer at Edwards AFB, California. While at Edwards AFB, he transferred from maintenance to test engineering and was responsible for instrumentation systems used for testing egress and parachute recovery systems. In 1979, he was assigned to a detachment of the Air Force Technical Applications Center at McClellan AFB, California, where he served as a system manager on nuclear activity detection equipment. In 1982, he was assigned as an Exchange Officer with the Royal Air Force at RAF Swanton Morley, United Kingdom. Here he was responsible for developing engine and airframe health monitoring systems. In 1984, he was transferred to the Air Force Acquisition Logistics Center at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Here he served briefly as a Staff Engineering Officer and was then assigned as the Director of Logistics for the National Aero-Space Plane Program.

Major Torigian holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Aeronautics from Parks College, St. Louis University and a Master of Science Degree in Systems Management from the University of Southern California.



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



Part of our College mission is distribution of the students' problem solving products to DOD sponsors and other interested agencies to enhance insight into contemporary, defense related issues. While the College has accepted this product as meeting academic requirements for graduation, the views and opinions expressed or implied are solely those of the author and should not be construed as carrying official sanction.

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**REPORT NUMBER** 88-2580  
**AUTHOR(S)** MAJOR ALBERT S. TORIGIAN  
**TITLE** BOOK ANALYSIS: THE STRAW GIANT

The Straw Giant, by Arthur T. Hadley and published in 1986, contends that there are serious faults inside the American Military that can prevent it from conducting effective operations. These faults, which explain our past defeats, manifest themselves in six recurring themes. Hadley has identified these themes as: (1) The Great Divorce (between society and the military), (2) Interservice and Intraservice Rivalry, (3) Flawed Organization, (4) Readiness, (5) Overcontrol and, (6) Keeping the Able From Contributing to the Action, or KAFCAs. Hadley also provides four major reforms to correct the faults: (1) Heal The Great Divorce through internal reforms; (2) Institute a just draft; (3) Reform the Joint Chiefs of Staff and; (4) Fund missions directly. This book analysis is limited to an examination of these themes and reforms. It also examines author Hadley to determine his credibility, which is rated as high.

This analysis examines the six themes to determine if they exist and represent significant recurring faults that can explain past failures in military operations. Each theme is

## CONTINUED

analyzed by examining Hadley's supporting information and by using outside sources to support or refute the themes. The analysis shows that the six themes exist, but they are not all significant faults nor recurring in so much as they have been a major contributor to past failures. Three themes are identified as significant: Interservice and Intraservice Rivalry; Flawed Organization; and Overcontrol.

Finally, an examination of Hadley's four major reforms is conducted to determine if they adequately address the themes and if they are practical to implement in light of any constraints. The conclusion is that the reforms never really address three of his themes: Interservice and Intraservice Rivalry, Overcontrol and KAFCA. Also, only reform three, Reforming the JCS, can be fully implemented. His other reforms, Instituting a Just Draft and Direct Mission Funding are not executable in light of current restraints, and his method for healing The Great Divorce can only be partially successful and implemented.

The overall conclusion of The Straw Giant, is that it is not possible to fully support the significance of the six themes. Also, the limited analysis on which the six themes are based does not constitute The Straw Giant as a scholarly work.

The author recommends that The Straw Giant be placed on PME suggested reading lists as it does provide an objective and historical overview of problems in the U.S. defense system.

## CHAPTER ONE

The thesis of The Straw Giant, by Arthur T. Hadley, is that "there are serious problems inside the American military" that weakens its defenses and can prevent it from conducting effective operations. (6:22) Central to Hadley's support of this thesis are his 'six basic themes' or recurring faults which explain the weaknesses in the military. (6:22) This paper limits itself to an analysis of these faults and Hadley's recommendations to overcome the faults. However, so that the reader can appreciate the full scope of this book and author Hadley's approach in supporting the thesis; the remainder of this chapter provides a chapter by chapter summary of The Straw Giant.

In "Chapter One - Prologue: Disaster In The Desert," Hadley uses the aborted Iran rescue mission of April 1980 as his attention getter. His 17-page summary of the mission illustrates many of the weaknesses that he later talks about in depth. The author then states his six basic themes to explain the Desert One disaster: "The Great Divorce (between society and the military); Interservice/Intraservice Rivalry; Flawed Organization; Readiness; Overcontrol; and finally; Keeping the Able From Contributing to the action, or KAFCA." These six themes will be dealt with in detail in Chapter Three of this paper.

In "Chapter Two - Getting To The Beginning," Hadley explains the origins and continuation of the six themes in an historical review of the military from 1740 to the present. He then explains how the individual services create "differing psychological attitudes" in their officers. The Army officer learns he cannot move without coordination and cooperation. Therefore, the Army officer "tends to perform better" in joint or interservice commands. The Navy officer, by serving in a "self-contained unit, his ship" learns independence of operation. "They like to be off by themselves" and tend to regard assignments to the Pentagon or any shore duty as "time wasted." This explains why naval officers do not do as well in joint commands and why they are the "most embroiled in intraservice warfare." Author Hadley thinks forces that mold an Air Force officer are more difficult to discern because it is "less historically defined." They are more attached to their "machinery" which has allowed them to conquer distance. "They

are more exuberant" and think "the future is theirs for the taking." However, their "marriage with technocracy" makes them more anti-intellectual. As a result, while "Navy and Army officers at their worst suffer from rigidity", Air Force officers "suffer from lack of brains." Hadley recognizes these generalizations "are always open to challenge", but they help explain the many problems that took place during the creation of the Department of Defense (DOD).

In "Chapter Three - The Chaotic Creation," Hadley describes the battles between the services during the defense reorganization after World War II. The reason for the reorganization was to improve coordination and reduce "duplications of time, material, and manpower." Hadley feels the "key service role was played by the fledgling Air Force." The bomber generals had maintained control and with long-range bombers and nuclear weapons they made the strong case that the cheapest form of defense was a reliance on strategic bombing. The Navy saw the Air Force encroaching on their role as "America's strategic service" and feared they "would seek additional missions, such as antisubmarine warfare." The Army, at war's end, "had already taken the most drastic cutbacks in size and equipment." Nevertheless, unlike the Navy, they supported a strong unified military. The results of all this was a Defense Department that was "disorganized, demoralized and without strategic guidance," over emphasis on strategic missions and weapons at the expense of tactical missions and weapons and, finally, a country again unprepared for war.

In "Chapter Four - Korea and NATO: Successes and Failures," Hadley explains we were facing a ground war "we had expected never again to fight." There had been an over confidence on airpower being "sufficient to defeat the North Koreans" which, of course, proved false. Certain Army units rushed to Korea at the beginning of the war "fell apart." "Interservice rivalry crippled secret warfare and intelligence." There was a critical shortage of manpower. Communications were such that the Navy planes "were unable to talk to the ground troops" or Air Force aircraft. As with Vietnam, the Korean War became unpopular at home and finally, Eisenhower brought the war to a close. Hadley states the decision not to employ nuclear weapons, even though considered, "may rank among the most important actions of that war," as a dangerous precedent could have been set. Next Hadley briefly describes the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the problems the services had in integrating with it. He states the weaknesses that are in NATO today - "the separation of the air and ground battle, the weakness of the U.S. ground forces, and the irrelevant doctrines for nuclear use - are a direct result of NATO's confused birth during an unpopular war."

"Chapter Five - Promise and Performance: The Gap Widens," describes further Defense Department reorganizations that started in 1953. These military reforms "would focus almost exclusively on the civilian side of the Pentagon." These civilian reforms at the expense of the military side of the DOD would continue and be "expanded under Secretary Robert S. McNamara in the 1960's." What resulted were military professionals who had "less and less influence over policy." Hadley states that additional frustrations were created by the inexperience of the top civilian officials. This was due to the turnover rate, which by 1982, was "two years and five months." At the same time the quality of "military was not at its best." Hadley describes several weapons development efforts, their successes and failures, and the interservice rivalry that sometimes resulted. Hadley goes into some detail describing the impact of Defense Secretary McNamara, who "arrogantly insulted the professionals", replaced them with "uniformed yes-men", created "new layers of civilian bureaucracy, and brought into the Pentagon "management experts and systems analysts." The result was that "the ablest, most highly motivated, most original officers began to leave the armed services in increasing numbers."

"Chapter Six - Vietnam - The Giant Stumbles" briefly describes how Hadley's six themes came into play. In 1954 the Joint Chiefs disagreed on involvement. The Army, under General Matthew B. Ridgeway, blocked intervention. However, "the early idealism" of President Kennedy combined with "faults inside the DOD" caused Army involvement to reach 12,000 men by 1964. However, many of these were specialists in irregular warfare who "went out to aid the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)." However, inside the military, "service with foreign troops remained a stigma" and many did not believe in the "Special Forces." As a result more conventional approaches won over, but the psychological strength of the enemy was "greater than perceived", and the U.S. drifted into "general war." Hadley then describes how the White House and the Pentagon "became bogged down in details that should have been left to the field commanders." He describes the arguments of the Joint Chiefs for maximum use of force versus McNamara's policy of "graduated response." The unfairness of the draft prevented the elite of society and the "Ivy Leaguers" from serving in Vietnam. Interservice rivalry made "unified direction of the air war ... absent." Hadley states that many officers lost their morale and the senior noncommissioned officers considered themselves "the forgotten men." Finally, Hadley states "our flawed military organization and policy led to defeat."

In "Chapter Seven - The Accuracy Revolution," Hadley talks about a new revolution in warfare being brought about by smart weapons. He thinks Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) for the battlefield introduce uncertainty which is a "further increment

of deterrence." However, the accuracy of strategic weapons decreases security because "a successful first strike ... could again become a possibility." Here Hadley recommends the use of space-based beam weapons to protect missile fields, and thus "we would be less fearful of a successful first strike." He feels "the changes being driven by this revolution affect the forces we have today, those we design for the future, and all our arms control policies and negotiations." Hadley warns against weapons that "solves all your problems." Finally, he states the human qualities of strength, courage, wisdom, and justice are still required "despite the continuing revolution in weapons."

In "Chapter Eight - Today's Strategic Forces - Expensively Unready," Hadley describes some of the readiness problems our strategic forces face. He emphasizes the importance of readiness but states "readiness always gets cut first." This occurs because big weapons programs are more visible to Congressmen who know the result can be "thousands of jobs" in their home state. He discusses the increased reliance on the use of females which he approves of, but he also brings out the problems of when they become pregnant. Hadley expresses his concern about the survivability of the nuclear command posts. He also expresses his concern "new space and strategic weapons systems, where the action will be," are not getting the most able personnel as these systems "threaten established weapons systems like ... the bomber fleet or fighter interceptors." He then discusses MX missile survivability and how interservice rivalry has complicated some approaches, such as the use of offshore freighters where the Air Force and Navy might have "to share control" and funds. Finally, Hadley questions the value of large aircraft carriers and feels they are "more of a vulnerable liability than an effective weapons system." Smaller carriers would allow assets to be spread out. He also questions whether senior naval officers appreciate the "electronic warfare center" that exists on the carriers because "this is where the ship's captain will win or lose his war."

In "Chapter Nine - Report From The Field," Hadley relates his observations from numerous visits to field units in Europe. He starts off by talking about the importance in maintaining readiness in Europe. He states "today you see improvement everywhere." However, prior to 1978, soldiers had a poor educational level, their "weapons and facilities were neglected," and "the armed services themselves were lying ... about how ready their forces were." He states the improvements to "conventional forces are ... undeniable and impressive," but there are still serious problems. He feels "cooperation between the Army and Air Force is certainly better than it was in Korea and Vietnam" and even as good as it was in WW II, but the Navy and Marines have yet to "join this interservice effort." He raises the question about the increased reliance on women near the battlefield. Will "the public and Congress ... seeing lots

of dead and dying servicewomen," demand "that women be removed from battle." He feels, as a result of the Great Divorce between the civilians and the military, there is "the belief that weapons can be designed that will turn mediocre soldiers into winners", which is used as "a rationale for not supporting a draft." He then raises serious doubts whether we can maintain air-to-ground communications to direct aircraft to the targets. Hadley finishes this chapter by raising his doubts on the nuclear deterrence. "The defense of Western Europe now rests on conventional forces that are lacking and a nuclear threat in which it is becoming more difficult to believe."

"Chapter Ten - To Replace Straw With Steel," contains Hadley's recommendations to solve the problems in the military system. They include: taking certain steps to heal the Great Divorce, a fair and just draft, reforming the JCS, funding defense missions directly, less personnel rotation, and expanding ROTC university programs to allow degrees in military affairs. These recommendations will be dealt with in detail in Chapter Four of this paper.



## CHAPTER TWO

No book analysis would be complete without a separate analysis of the author to establish his expertise and credibility. This is especially important in analyzing The Straw Giant as author Hadley tends to make many sweeping generalizations and conclusions, relying heavily on his background and experience. This analysis will be based on: (1) an examination of Hadley's professional career and related military activities; (2) other books written that have military relevance; and (3) book reviews of The Straw Giant.

An examination of Hadley's professional career shows he has had a fair amount of association with the military through out the years, though primarily as a journalist. Arthur T. Hadley, born in 1924, in New York, N.Y., served in the Army from 1942 - 1946. He "spent seven months in the ranks as a tanker and then, after three months in Officer Candidate School, became ... a second lieutenant." (6:XIII) He was initially assigned to a tank battalion as a platoon leader and was then assigned to "a new type of unit ... being formed to shoot propaganda leaflets in artillery shells and make loudspeaker broadcasts to the enemy." (6:XIII) He was eventually promoted to major and received the "Purple Heart and Silver Star." (28:223) After the war, Hadley entered Yale University where he received his B.A. (with honors) in education in 1949. (28:223) From then on, he has worked almost continuously as a journalist. He worked for Newsweek from 1949 - 1953 as a DOD correspondent. (28:223) He was a consultant on arms control to the Stanford Research Institute, 1961 - 1965, and a consultant on Army training to Arthur D. Little, Inc., 1971 to the present. (28:223) He also served as member-secretary of the Army Psychological Warfare Advisory Board, 1949 - 1952. In 1960, he received grants from the National Academy of Arts and Sciences and the 20th Century Fund for his "work in arms control." (28:223) In 1971, he "received several other awards" for his reporting in Vietnam. (28:223) Based on the above, Hadley cannot be considered an authority on the armed forces even though he has maintained a long association with the military. No doubt, as a journalist sympathetic to the military, he has established many personal contacts (some mentioned in his book) and sources of information to lend strong credibility to his facts - but not necessarily to the manner in which he interprets them.

Hadley has written five other books. Only one of them has any military relevance. The Nation's Safety and Arms Control was written in 1961 and deals with the theories of arms control and the alternatives to achieve that control. Since he received a grant from the National Academy of Arts and Sciences for work in this area (see above), it is reasonably safe to presume this book is credible. This establishes that Hadley has developed a fair amount of expertise in this subject, albeit it might be dated by today's information and technology.

Since The Straw Giant came out in 1986, it has received mixed reviews from historians and literary critics. The January 1987 Military Review, page 90, states that "Hadley's book is less than satisfactory on several counts"; Hadley "writes with an irritating tone of moral and intellectual superiority ... and the reader has to take many of the incidents and conversations the author records on faith since he rarely identifies his sources." Finally, it states "to anyone even vaguely familiar with the current reform movement, few of Hadley's ideas are new." In the May-June 1987 Business Horizons, page 82-83, it states this book "provides a useful survey for the layman of some of the systemic problems that have impaired the effectiveness of the armed forces for decades." It goes on to state the book's "greatest contribution ... is its linkage of macro-level problems to micro-level failures." Finally, it states "Although The Straw Giant places meaningful reform commentary in the hands of a lay audience, the issues are not well enough developed to call it a scholarly work, and the prescriptions are largely superficial." In the September 1986 New Republic, page 34-39, it states "As his [Hadley's] narrative and his digressions make clear, he knows the military establishment well, and thus he represents a breed of journalist that most officers believe no longer exists - someone who knows the military from the inside, who sympathizes with its members, who honors its values even as he exposes its failings." "Although one might quibble with some of Hadley's discussion, he does provide a vivid and generally accurate picture of the American armed forces." In the May 1987 Book Review Digest, page 156-157, three condensed reviews are provided (two from newspapers) and all are favorable.

In analyzing all the above, some conclusions can be drawn about Hadley's expertise and credibility. He does not have the military education or technical and operational expertise to be considered an authority on the armed services and their weapon systems. However, his career certainly shows he has more than a working acquaintance with the military. His one other book on arms control no doubt provided some expertise when he discussed this subject in The Straw Giant. Though the book reviews were mixed, none of them ever challenged Hadley's credentials. The final conclusion about Hadley is that his experiences while serving in the Army in WW II and his career as a military

correspondent and consultant lends strong credibility to his analysis of the armed forces, especially, when he treats his subject on a macro level, which he usually does.

## CHAPTER THREE

This chapter will explain, analyze, and support or refute, the 'six basic themes' that author Hadley uses to support his thesis that "there are serious problems inside the American military" that weakens American defenses and can prevent it from conducting effective operations. (6:22) The author claims these six themes are recurring faults that exist within the American Defense System. "Sometimes these six are separate, sometimes they weave together. All of them helped create the disaster at Desert One [during the Iran rescue attempt]. All of them will be present at our next defeat." (1:22) These six themes are: (1) the Great Divorce, (2) Interservice/Intraservice Rivalry, (3) Flawed Organization, (4) Readiness, (5) Overcontrol, and (6) Keeping the Able From Contributing to the Action, or KAFCAs.

### THEME ONE - THE GREAT DIVORCE

"The Great Divorce is the less-than-amicable separation of the military from the financial, business, political, and intellectual elites of this country, particularly from the last two." (6:22) The author provides a historical perspective from 1740 to the present where he describes how this distrust between the military and society always existed though the "military were fairly well integrated into society, and military service was considered a prestigious profession" during the pre-and-post Civil War years. (6:30) This distrust at the end of the Vietnam War led to all "things military reviled." (6:67) Hadley states that this divorce, in concert with an all volunteer system, has resulted in armed forces recruitment from a "limited economic cross section of society" making the services "periously thin" in able people. This also resulted in "civilians in positions of power inside the government and outside [who] tend to lack hands on experience of the armed forces" and therefore, fail to identify problems correctly. (6:22) The most serious effects that Hadley seems to attribute to the Great Divorce occurred during the years of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. As a result of this "whiz kid's arrogant foolishness" there was a heavy dependence on civilians who excluded military advice and even denigrated the military officer. (6:67) This led to the rise of the bureaucratic and management-oriented officer corps. Hadley quotes former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who described the "new breed" of officer being promoted, who were better versed in the "systems analysis arguments so much in

vogue ... and more skillful in bureaucratic maneuvering." (6:170) "[This] ... deprived the policy process of the ... more relevant assessments which ... are needed when issues are reduced to a test of arms." (6:170) Hadley makes very strong arguments as to the existence and effects of this Great Divorce which can be, for the most part, be substantiated.

#### THEME ONE ANALYSIS

Samuel Huntington in his book, The Soldier and the State, describes how The Great Divorce has always been with us because of a historical "anti-military ideology" typical in our type of society. (7:96,97,153,154,268) He goes on to describe the "prevalence of liberalism in the United States" which has been, and continues to be, openly hostile to the military and prevented our military leaders from preparing for war until this country was openly threatened. (7:143-157) This was very evident in the negative affects of the McNamara years "where there was a derogation of the military role at top levels of government." (26:69) Edward Luttwak, the well known defense analyst, in his book, The Pentagon and the Art of War, states, even today, there is little doubt that most congressmen "persist in applying the wrong criterion in their examination of military matters." (8:138) He goes on to say the same for Department of Defense (DOD) civilians "many of whom care little about their ignorance of strategy, operational craft and tactics, and present themselves as managers capable of managing all things." (8:138,269) However, under recently retired Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger, "the interference of civilians in military decisions has greatly diminished, but nothing has been put in its place." (8:271) Therefore, Hadley may be considered correct in stating civilians cannot identify problems correctly and therefore, do not provide adequate oversight when military malpractices take place. (8:42) This is especially disturbing since there may be still a "great number of demilitarized military officers whose professional outlook is managerial" (8:138) and positions where "military experts have been replaced by managerial technocrats." (5:14)

Hadley's contention that the Great Divorce causes the military to recruit from a limited segment of society, which prevents the military from acquiring a sufficient number of able people, is only half correct. It is true the armed forces draw "heavily from the lower middle class" but they have traditionally drawn from this class. (20:177) There is "no convincing evidence that the quality of today's recruits is inadequate" (3:223) or that they perform at a lower level than those acquired under a conscription system. (20:179) It should be pointed out that the Air Force and Navy "have always had volunteers." (3:222) "Between 1953 and 1973, 32.4 percent of all males entering the armed forces were drafted. Of those, 48 percent were drafted into the Army." (3:222) Even for the Army

the all volunteer system "yields soldiers who perform better and stay in the service at a higher rate ... and is cheaper overall." (3:222) Also, by definition, the elites constitute a small cross section of this society and therefore, their contribution of able people would be limited. Ideally and morally, the burden of defense should be spread equitably to all classes of society but this has not happened historically even when there was a draft. (9:331,396,559) Nevertheless, there has always been a sufficient number of able people in the military which is supported by the fact that "this nation has been militarily safe throughout some of the most critical years in history." (26:70)

To summarize this analysis of Hadley's first theme, the Great Divorce, it can be said that this divorce exists and has clearly had, and will probably continue to have, a negative effect on the military through out the years. It has not prevented the military from recruiting able people though clearly, as Hadley contends, much of the civilian leadership in the defense system are not qualified. The Great Divorce will always be with us in varying degrees though, hopefully, the extremely negative effects of the McNamara years will not be repeated.

#### THEME TWO - INTERSERVICE/INTRASERVICE RIVALRY

In Hadley's second theme or fault, Interservice and Intraservice rivalry, he is able to provide a great deal of examples to illustrate the negative impacts these rivalries have had. He discusses the pre World War II rivalries such as the Army fighter verses bomber arguments which led to too much emphasis on the bomber and high initial losses in the following war. He discusses the Navy, which he considers the most divided service, and how the submariners were ignored which led to poor officers being assigned and the inability of our torpedoes to work. He discusses how the Marines were unable to "get amphibious tactics taught at the Naval War College." (6:34) He then describes the well known interservice rivalries that took place during the reorganizations in the post-World War II years which led to false charges by the Navy about the Air Force and in particular the abilities of the B-36 bomber so as to "stop the runaway self-aggrandizement of the newly independent Air Force." (6:96) He states that, even today, the Navy opposes unity of command and unification efforts. (6:96) He then goes on to provide more current examples. During the Korean War, "able officers began avoiding joint duty as a threat to their careers ... because their services would punish them." (6:108) About the Vietnam War, he quotes General Bruce Palmer, commander of the American Army in Vietnam: "Undivided responsibility and unified direction of the [air] war was conspicuously absent." (6:181) Finally, in the beginning of The Straw Giant, Hadley describes the Iran rescue mission and the distrust between the

Army and Marine personnel and the foolish decision to use the unqualified Marines to pilot the helicopters just so they could play a part in the mission." (6:23)

## THEME TWO ANALYSIS

In analyzing Hadley's second theme, other sources clearly illustrate the damaging effects of these military rivalries. First, it should be pointed out that service rivalries do not necessarily lead to conflict. On the contrary, they lead to negotiation to protect each others interests. (3:281) The real danger is that this leads to gaps and duplicity in our defenses. Thus, this system "favors the parochial interests of the services too much and the larger needs of the Nation's defenses too little." (3:281) In Vietnam "single service interests continued to block and frustrate unity of command and joint operations." (24:13) Former Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Air Force General David Jones stated "each service, instead of integrating efforts with the others, considered Vietnam it's own war and sought out to carve out a large mission for itself." (24:13) Interservice rivalries have led to major problems in communications at both the strategic and tactical level. For example it is well known that "in Grenada, the Army ground force commander on one side of the tiny island could not communicate effectively with the Marine commander on the other side because their radios were incompatible." (22:79) One of the reasons the Iran rescue failed "can be traced to the planning stages of the mission when all the military services insisted on being involved regardless of whether or not their participation was appropriate." (24:14) "The helicopters that crashed fatally ... were piloted by Marines who were unfamiliar with them, and who seemed to have been assigned the job to give every service a role." (1:42) Even doctrine has been affected, for example, "each service has developed its own air doctrine, oftentimes with disregard for the total air power situation." (26:71)

However, what Hadley never discusses is that rivalries can be productive as well by allowing competing views to reach senior level decision makers. (24:18) "Interservice rivalry has the beneficial effect of spurring innovation in defense policy and in the development of doctrine and equipment in support of a strategic or tactical approach that may seem irrelevant at the time." (23:105) Therefore, Interservice and Intraservice Rivalry can be productive in that it allows numerous, though perhaps biased, organizational and service positions to be surfaced and voiced and prevents a single-service position from predominating before all the facts are in.

In summarizing this analysis of Hadley's second theme, there is no doubt that military rivalries have been very damaging. Service rivalries can also be productive. The

problem is, there must be an organizational structure that is able to properly discriminate and select the best position and without unduly compromising it. Unfortunately, this may not be possible if the organizational structure is flawed as Hadley contends, which leads to his third theme.

### THEME THREE - FLAWED ORGANIZATION

Flawed organization is, according to Hadley, "seldom understood and, being deemed bureaucratic and dull, is often dismissed as unimportant," but "the dull ax is the one most apt to glance off the log and remove your foot." (6:24) Hadley goes on to state that flawed organization is particularly damaging at the top layers of the Defense Department such as the JCS, where the Chairman "has little actual power." (6:24) He appears to blame many of today's problems on the committee-based JCS structure of World War II which was created by the four senior service officers. This JCS had no formal standing and, as a result, "created serious wartime problems" because "it could neither control nor influence" the legally created wartime boards and agencies." (6:45) In the post-war "peace time world, with the urgent need for cooperation gone, the old Joint Chiefs arrangement ... broke down, and it continues in disarray." (6:45) Hadley goes on to describe in detail many of the post-war reorganization battles against unification, in which the Navy was and still is the greatest opponent. He states this led to a Defense Department "disorganized, demoralized", (6:97) and which continued to prepare for the wrong war (nuclear war) and was unprepared for Korea. Hadley next describes some of our problems in the Korean War, further reorganization battles and organization problems in the Vietnam War where the "Flawed Organization of the Defense Department could not align itself to fight efficiently." (6:175) For example, the theater commander in Vietnam was not General William Westmoreland at Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), "which supposedly ran the war" but was the Commander In Chief Pacific, an admiral stationed in Hawaii. (6:174) Finally, his most recent example concerns the Iran rescue mission: "when flawed plans to free the hostages were advanced, plans that favored a particular career or service, these could not simply be turned down by the Chairman [of the JCS] or someone selected as mission commander." (6:25) Hadley goes on to state that there was no such commander and "each plan had to be studied by the staff until it died a slow bureaucratic death ... so genuine problems ... never got full attention." (6:25)

### THEME THREE ANALYSIS

There exists a wealth of information and studies to corroborate Hadley's contention that Flawed Organization exists within the DOD/JCS structure and that it has caused serious



problems. In the excellent book, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, by U.S. Army Colonel Harry Summers, the author goes into great detail on the shortfalls of the command organization which prevented unity of effort. "Without Unity of Effort we could never have "decisive application of full combat power." (10:149) The Defense Organization Study of 1977-1980 (1:XIX-XXI) and the 1985 Defense Organization Project conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of Georgetown University (2:2) are two in-depth studies which highlight many serious DOD organization problems. The President's own blue ribbon commission on defense management found in 1986 the "Defense Department plagued by numerous organizational problems." (18:21) Most of the flaws exist within joint commands, staff, and operations where interservice rivalry fuels the problems. "Each of the unified and specified commands appear to be designed as the operational arm of an individual service, rather than as an integrated, all arms combat force." (22:82) Technology improvements have pointed towards more cooperation among our different forces. "Yet the U.S. Military Establishment remains overly constrained by the artificial divisions among these forces and the shortcomings of the current joint command arrangements." (22:69) This has led to flaws in the chain of command which, as in the case of Lebanon where 250 Marines lost their lives in October 1983, have become "too lengthy, cumbersome, and clogged by inappropriate interfaces to be able to react quickly and professionally to operational necessities." (2:52) Even in Grenada, which was clearly a victory by our military forces, "the organization itself, the overall chain of command, ... made their mission much more dangerous than it otherwise would have been." (24:15) Finally, numerous senior officers and former Chiefs of Staff, most notably former JCS Chairman, Air Force General David Jones and former Army Chief of Staff, General Edward Meyer, have recognized the flaws in the DOD/JCS structure and recommended changes. (15:24) This has culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act passed on 11 September 1986. (18:21; 15:2)

In summary, Hadley's third theme, Flawed Organization and the serious problems it has caused, can be substantiated though this fault may no longer be as relevant in light of current reorganization. Also, it should not be forgotten that the Flawed Organization was also responsible for the "shining successes such as last year's [1985] precision interception of the Achille Lauro hijackers aboard an Egyptian airliner and this year's [1986] retaliatory raid against Libya." (26:70)

#### THEME FOUR - READINESS

The fourth recurring theme that Hadley says weakens American defenses is readiness which he defines as "how prepared to fight a unit is at a given moment." (6:26) His contention is

that readiness has been made to suffer as a result of supply shortages and unrealistic or limited training. His evidence is based largely on his visits to field units and observing them during the normal course of operations where he takes note of maintenance, supply, and training shortcomings. He describes his June 1979 ride in a B-52 which had difficulty in starting it's engines, had problems in keeping the gyroscopic instruments working, and could not release it's short range attack missiles (SRAM). He states such problems and the resulting unreadiness take place because money tends to be spent on new systems versus supplies and training. In defence of the military, he describes how congressmen are quick to cut readiness to support contracts in their home states. (6:218) He relates his experiences with U.S. forces in NATO where Army units performed so poorly in exercises in the late 1970's and early 1980's, but states "the improvements in our conventional forces are also undeniable and impressive." (6:246) He questions the ability of our forces to command and control in the complicated NATO war scenarios, where interservice rivalry also affects our readiness. For example, Navy and Marine forces comprise "40 percent of all tactical air assets;" but it would take weeks to get them there, and they would never have trained with NATO forces, which would seriously limit their value. (6:265-266) He also describes how the Navy will not allow their assets to be commanded from the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). (6:260) However, he also states cooperation between the Army and Air Force "is certainly better than it was in Korea and Vietnam." (6:253) In regards training, he provides examples where the training is unrealistic but also mentions the "superb Air Force Red Flag maneuvers." (6:260) Finally, Hadley devotes considerable space on how the increasing use of women can impact readiness. He is not opposed to their use but questions what will happen to readiness when women are killed in war. He feels this society is opposed to women dying in war, which will certainly happen whether they fill direct combat positions in the future or just fill support positions, as they currently do, in units close to the front. Will the public and congress demand "that women be removed far from the battle, leaving no one trained to handle the complex military equipment?" (6:259)

#### THEME FOUR ANALYSIS

There is no doubt that traditionally readiness has suffered. The CSIS study mentioned in the previous paragraphs indicate "inadequate attention" has been given to readiness in the interests of "modernization and expansion." (2:78,149) This is borne out by examining the 1980 thru 1985 defence budgets where operations and maintenance costs (as a percentage of the total budget) decreased from 33% to 27% while investments increased from 36% to 49%. (8:213) Therefore, there is a shortage of spare parts and even "war stock needed to supply and support just the forces committed to NATO are less than half of

what the wartime requirements are projected to be." (5:26) Also, it is difficult to keep the Air Force and Navy aircraft operational rates above 65% and 60% respectively because of a lack of spares. (8:211; 5:27-32) However, though there appears to always be a shortage of trained personnel, the training function already consumes "between 10 and 14 percent of the entire defence budget." (1:67) As a result, there is every reason to believe that "the quality of our soldiers and units has never been higher." (14:27) Our training methods have improved in realism as exemplified by the Air Force Red Flag and Navy Top Gun exercises and schools. However, there may be shortfalls in the training realism employed by the Army in adopting to their AirLand Battle Doctrine. (14:18-27) Also, in the Marines, combat service support elements (CSSEs) are not trained realistically "because logistics elements are not allowed by current exercise scenarios to operate in a wartime environment." (19:44) However, all services are now improving night fighting capability and training which were serious shortcomings in Vietnam. (17:29) Hadley's women verses readiness issue is valid one, and how society will cope with women dying in combat needs to be addressed. Undoubtedly, in a NATO war many women will die as over 200,000 women are in the armed forces and 51% of the Army's occupations are open to them. (16:41; 27:30) Finally, the case can be made that the failures received in military operations since Vietnam were "not caused by any lack of readiness of all the equipment, nor by any inadequacy in the training of all the manpower" but rather were caused by organizational and other shortfalls. (8:212)

In summarizing the analysis of this fourth theme, it is clear that today's armed forces have received a great deal of training and achieved a great deal of readiness. It is also clear that there are readiness problems, but it is arguable as to how much of a problem and how much readiness is required. What Hadley does not state is that readiness payoffs "are difficult to explicitly measure, compare, and evaluate." (3:226) Therefore, how does one compare the value of readiness versus money for more manpower and equipment? Thus, Hadley does not make a convincing case, nor is there sufficient evidence to support, that readiness is indeed the major recurring problem he makes it out to be.

#### THEME FIVE - OVERCONTROL

The fifth theme is Overcontrol or "Russification of American armed forces." (6:26) Hadley states that "in American military actions, real and simulated, the air is jammed with electronic chatter as those at the top try to keep control over the tiniest details." (6:27) Hadley feels this fault of overcontrol started with President Kennedy who "diminished the importance of the people in the armed services by topping them with additional layers of civilians." (6:141) "For the first

time the tendency to overcontrol appeared as the White House and top civilians in the Defense Department began sending overly detailed directives to the forces in the field." (6:141) Hadley states this was "a process that was to continue through Vietnam into today." (6:141) Hadley cites the case of the disastrous Tactical Fighter Experimental Program (TFX) which became the FB-111. "The final buy decision was made in great secrecy by [Defense Secretary] McNamara acting alone" (6:154), who ignored the recommendations of his military boards, "all of which had recommended the contract go to Boeing rather than General Dynamics." (6:154) Hadley feels overcontrol led to the use of 'Graduated Response', over the maximum use of force, in the air war over Vietnam as both McNamara and President Johnson overruled the JCS and all the intelligence agencies. (6:172-173) The most extreme and well known example of overcontrol provided by Hadley concerns President Johnson, who like the rest of "high Pentagon officials continued to be obsessed with tactical detail." (6:173) Johnson is quoted as saying "I don't want those Air Force generals to bomb the smallest shithouse north of the 17th parallel without checking with me." (6:174) As a result, Johnson would pick out North Vietnam targets from "aerial photos spread on his rug." (6:174) Hadley also states that senior commanders in Vietnam "were keeping such tight rein on battlefield details, they to were neglecting the more difficult questions of broad policy." (6:174) Finally, Hadley provides a few more recent examples of overcontrol, most notably the Iran rescue mission: "Those waiting at Desert One for the helicopters could and did communicate with the White House; but they could not explain the weather to the oncoming helicopters or talk to the rangers guarding the desert airstrip." (6:27)

#### THEME FIVE ANALYSIS

In analyzing this theme, it is clear the legacy of overcontrol from President Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara has persisted over the years. The lack of authority granted to the commanders of the Iran and Lebanon missions are but two well known examples. "When a decision had to be made as to whether to abort the [Iran] mission, no one on the ground had the authority to implement the decision." (5:105) "The Marines killed in Beirut in 1983 served under a commander who had no authority to choose a defensible position." (11:42) Certainly, overcontrol is very pervasive at the higher levels within the DOD, and this has been confirmed by the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee during their three-year study of the DOD organization. (24:20-46) The Office of the Secretary of Defense is guilty of micromanagement because "it focuses on control of functional activities and not on broader issues of policy and mission integration." (24:27) Also, the "JCS have defined full operational command too narrowly" (2:13) and this has restricted the control and authority of the unified and specified commanders in chief (CINCs). (22:83; 24:30,35) Even though

these CINCs are supposed to have full operational command of their forces, the service chiefs have, nevertheless, retained the "dominant role in operational planning and direction. (22:83) Of course, as the Senate study documented, matters are not helped any by a Congress which themselves "extensively micromanages DOD" and greatly contributes to the problem. (24:46)

One of the results of a command structure that exerts overcontrol is the removal of lower level mission commanders from the planning process. "None of the men who planned the ... [Iran, Lebanon, and Grenada] military operations ... was directly involved in their execution. Worse, none of the mission commanders was involved in the planning process." (5:197) In December 1983, two Navy aircraft were shot down over Lebanon when too many aircraft were placed in a small target area in broad daylight and over anti-aircraft positions. Flying in predictable attack formations, the Navy aircraft approached from 20,000 feet and "thus [made] the aircraft easy targets." (5:142) "The AirWing officers on board the carrier ... did not have the authority to plan the attack of their own squadrons," and thus, "the lower ranking officers in place, who actually [knew] the situation, [counted] for nothing." (8:58-59)

In summary of this fifth theme, Overcontrol, it can be deduced that Hadley has accurately identified it as a serious recurring fault. It is a fault that has certainly been recognized by the DOD leadership and, with the current reorganization, some decentralization of control should take place.

#### THEME SIX - KAFCA

"Present in the Iranian desert and throughout the armed forces today is KAFCA." (6:27) KAFCA, is Hadley's acronym for "Keeping the Able From Contributing to the Action", his sixth and final recurring theme. He makes it synonymous for personnel mismanagement and states "in part KAFCA is an outgrowth of the Intraservice part of Interservice/Intraservice Rivalry; but it is destructive enough to merit consideration on its own." (6:27) KAFCA takes place because the services place their ablest people in those missions "they consider most vital to their self interest." (6:27) Hadley describes how in World War II the infantry were prevented from receiving the best soldiers. He quotes from the Army's official history which describes how Army assignment procedures by the end of 1943, "had reduced to a dangerously low level the number of men allotted to the ground forces who seemed likely to perform effectively in combat." (6:54) He states "to try to overcome the assignment of the least able to the infantry and armor" the more veteran divisions resorted to illegal means to acquire replacements. (6:55) Going on to the Korean War, Hadley describes how, at the war's

beginning, "43 percent of the ground troops in the Far East tested in the lowest two categories on the Army intelligence tests ... and the ablest of the Army's soldiers were back in the United States." (6:106) In the Vietnam War "men who could command in combat had been replaced with managers who could swing the bureaucratic lead." (6:142) According to Hadley, KAFCA kept American officers from supporting the Special Forces or the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), and, as a result, "the United States drifted into general war." (6:170) Finally, Hadley attributes the selection of the unqualified Marine helicopter pilots in the Iran mission to KAFCA as well.

#### THEME SIX ANALYSIS

An analysis of Hadley's sixth theme, does substantiate some of his serious assertions, but there are also major flaws in his arguments. It is true that in World War II, "the most intelligent men went into technical billets, the others into the infantry." (9:453) Also, "In 1944, 40 percent of the enlisted men in an American division were classified as below average in intelligence." (9:453) Hadley's examples on Korea and Vietnam can also be corroborated. (9:487,492,554) It is also true, that in Vietnam, the Army regulars ignored the Special Forces and even the Air Force, at wars end, "disbanded" the Special Operations Force. (4:289) However, in World War II (as Hadley also describes) "the best American divisions were as good as any in the war." (9:452-453) Still, the majority of American divisions needed heavy artillery and air support "to best their German opponents." (9:435) But, in Korea, American troops fought with extreme skill and in Vietnam, the infantry "fought with skill and elan." (9:498,554).

Hadley states that KAFCA exists as a result of the services maintaining special interests and thus prevents them from putting their best people in important positions outside those interests. In regards to JCS Joint Staff assignments, this has certainly been true. Former JCS Chairman General David Jones stated these "were not the most desired of positions" as "an officer's career advancement depends on loyalty to the individual service to which he belongs." (21:2) However, there is no evidence that KAFCA was a major 'recurring fault' in any of our operations since Vietnam. (2:50-53,117-118; 8:212) Hadley uses the Iran example of the Marine helicopter pilots who were selected over more qualified Air Force pilots. Those Marines may have been very capable in carrying out missions typical of their specialty, but they were tasked to perform outside what their speciality required. This is an example more of Flawed Organization or Interservice Rivalry than of KAFCA as it was in the Marines' special interests to put their best people on the mission.

In summary of this last theme, KAFCA, the conclusion that must be drawn is that it is not the major recurring fault Hadley considers it to be. Certainly, it exists but it is more a symptom of Flawed Organization rather than a major fault in it's own right.

### CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of Hadley's six themes leads to the following conclusions:

1. That all six themes exist but they have not all been significant faults nor recurring in so much as they have been a major contributor to past failures in military operations.

2. That the themes of Interservice/Intraservice Rivalry, Flawed Organization, and Overcontrol have been significant recurring faults.

3. That the themes of The Great Divorce, Readiness, and KAFCA exist but they have not been significant recurring faults nor have they all even been a factor in past military failures.

## CHAPTER FOUR

In the tenth and final chapter of The Straw Giant, author Hadley presents his reforms to cure the faults his six themes represent. The following is an examination of those reforms to determine if they address the faults and whether they are practical to implement in light of any constraints. Hadley presents four "major necessary reforms" (6:293) complemented by two minor ones:

1. Heal The Great Divorce.
  - a. Less assignment rotation.
  - b. Expand Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC).
2. Institute a just draft.
3. Reform the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
4. Fund missions directly.

### REFORM ONE - HEAL THE GREAT DIVORCE

"The first reform necessary is for those inside and outside ... to work to heal The Great Divorce." (6:276) Hadley states this should be done by requesting "the civilian elites recognize the armed forces as an important part of America." (6:276) He states that if attitudes about the military change and the military makes certain reforms (such as less assignment rotation) then the able people of the next generation will "seek the action" of the military and their "drive ... for success will of itself help heal The Great Divorce." (6:279)

To help this healing, Hadley provides two complementary reforms: less assignment rotation and broadening ROTC programs at the universities. Hadley feels too much assignment rotation creates turbulence and careerism and is a result of a "system that requires officers to hold a wide variety of jobs in order to get ahead." (6:294) Finally, he recommends that ROTC programs be expanded by having universities offer a "major in military affairs." (6:294-295) The purpose is to heal the divorce between 'academia' and the military.



## REFORM ONE ANALYSIS

Hadley's prescription for healing The Great Divorce hinges on improving perceptions and confidences. As previously stated, history indicates, there will always be distrust between society and the military, and Hadley's reforms will not change that. Still, legitimate reforms could build public confidence. Longer assignments are a step in the right direction and necessary for proficiency, especially at the higher levels of the defense system. The turbulence of rapid assignment rotations, and resulting loss of proficiency (5:9-13), has given the perception to our congressional and even military leaders that "the officer corps thinks more like businessmen than warriors." (24:30) "As late as 1979, tenure in [Army] command was only 18 months." (11:42) General Edward Meyer, as Army Chief of Staff, raised it to 30 months but it dropped back to 24 months, when he retired. (11:42) Civilian policy makers in the DOD average only 28 months." (3:281) Also, for military units the assignment rotation of officers and enlisted men "range from 14 percent per month to 25 percent per month, and in some units it is almost a hundred percent a year." (5:10) This creates major problems for those units as it is "difficult to develop any sense of confidence, competence and cohesion." (5:10) Based on a 1985 House Armed Services Committee report, assignment rotation was a major cause of unreadiness. (5:10) Therefore, Hadley can be considered correct that this reform (along with others) can lead to more confidence in military abilities and, thus, more respect by society as a whole. Certainly, this reform could be implemented and, in fact, is inevitable with the current budget reductions. Also, the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act requires longer joint staff tours. (18:25)

Hadley's reform to expand ROTC, by having universities enlarge their curriculums to include military related subjects, is a laudable one but probably not very realistic. Having the university academics play a bigger part in military education could make the military more attractive to a larger cross section of students. However, the services are unlikely to attempt any expansion for fear this would be interpreted as more militarization. Also, ROTC does not attract a high enough interest within the services. They do not encourage the best officers to seek ROTC jobs and "do not portray these assignments in a positive manner." (13:37) Hadley's KAFCA theme is, unfortunately, a player here.

In summary, Hadley's reforms to heal The Great Divorce could only be partially successful. "The American public, historically and today, views the military with skepticism, mistrust and open hostility." (13:37) Certainly, longer assignments and other reforms are a good practical approach to create more confidence in the military. However, expanding ROTC programs is unrealistic in light of the lack of interest in the military and fear of offending the universities.

## REFORM TWO - A JUST DRAFT

Hadley's second major reform, "establishing a fair and just draft" (6:279), is also directed at The Great Divorce and at Readiness. He feels the draft is necessary to acquire sufficient numbers of able recruits. Also, it would make the burden of defense more equitable as "the middle class, both white and black, is conspicuously absent as are the sons and daughters of the elites." (6:280)

## REFORM TWO ANALYSIS

There are many who agree with Hadley that a fair draft is necessary because the all volunteer forces (AVF) cannot provide the high quality personnel required and because it does not spread the burden of defense equitably across society. However, as previously explained, the AVF is providing quality people. The services desire to recruit their personnel from those who score in Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) mental categories I-III, which encompasses "the top 69 percent of the male youth ability distribution." (20:171) "From 1952 to 1973, 78.7 percent of recruits were in AFQT categories I-III. Since the advent of the AVF [1973], 80.5 percent have been in these categories." (20:173)

Another quality factor is the percentage of recruits being high school graduates. This is important because it has been proven that "smart, educated soldiers are better soldiers." (3:222) "From FY 1964-73 an average of 71 percent of total active duty nonprior service recruits received high school diplomas. During the AVF from FY 1973-82, the average was 72 percent." (20:175)

It is true that periodically the services, most notably the Army, have had difficulty in meeting their recruitment goals. However, this has occurred when there were cutbacks in pay and the G.I. Bill. (3:223) Some may argue, then, that the AVF is more expensive, but, even with higher pay and benefits, it is cheaper because volunteers are more productive and stay longer. (3:224) Therefore, experience and readiness is enhanced.

Hadley is definitely correct that the military population is not representative of society. The services "have traditionally drawn, and continue to draw, heavily from the lower middle class." (20:177) Hadley and others properly feel that "a democracy must not rely on volunteers or mercenaries, but every citizen ought to understand that he himself has to sacrifice some part of his life to maintain a secure defense." (25:45) Thus, a just draft could help heal The Great Divorce by making society play a greater part in it's defense.

However, it is not likely the draft will be re-instituted because it is "politically infeasible." (3:222) As a result of the problems with Vietnam, a return to the draft could cause domestic controversy. (25:45) Even Hadley admits politicians do not want the draft because it would select people "who might vote against them." (6:282) A draft might just aggravate The Great Divorce and so it would be wiser to remain with the AVF.

In summary, Hadley's reform for a just draft is unnecessary to ensure a quality force for readiness. Though it might help heal The Great Divorce by giving society greater participation in it's defense, it is just as likely to cause controversy and aggravate The Great Divorce.

#### REFORM THREE - REFORM THE JCS

"Reform of the Flawed Organization of the Joint Chiefs is another necessary action." (6:285) Hadley recommends that the plan of General David Jones be implemented. (6:285) Hadley then goes into some detail to explain the Jones plan; i.e., strengthen the authority of the JCS Chairman and the Joint Staff, provide more authority to unified and specified command CINCs, longer staff tours, etc.

#### REFORM THREE ANALYSIS

The Jones' plan reforms have been well recognized as necessary and are incorporated in the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act. This should cure most of the ills of Hadley's Flawed Organization, at least at the higher levels within the DOD.

#### REFORM FOUR - DIRECT MISSION FUNDING

"Civilian control over the Defense Department and the Military's own efficiency can be increased if the major defense missions are funded directly, rather than through the three services at present." (6:292) Hadley feels the money should pass from Congress to the Secretary of Defense, to the JCS Chairman, and then to the CINC that has the mission. (6:292) Hadley states this would help ensure the services use the money as intended by Congress and would make sure the services give the right priority to what the command CINCs need.

#### REFORM FOUR ANALYSIS

This reform is not specially directed at any theme but presumably it would be used for curing The Flawed Organization and improving Readiness. This reform was incorporated to a limited degree in the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act, which allows the CINCs to submit their own budgets. (12:3) The CINCs are only given funding for "joint exercises, force training and contingencies." (12:3) However, they are given a greater role in the budget planning process by submitting their priority needs directly to the JCS Chairman and Defense Secretary. The

JCS Chairman and the services must then account for how the priorities were addressed in the budget plans. (12:3)

The current process does not give the CINCs the budget authority recommended by Hadley, but the CINCs themselves, who testified in Congress, stated "they had no resources for planning and managing their own budgets and would prefer to stick to their operational responsibilities." (12:3) The CINCs made a valid point, since one of the criticisms of the military has been their over emphasis on acquiring funding and a "consequence of this ... is that the military Services are becoming more oriented toward business management than toward planning for and fighting a war." (24:29)

Hadley's contention his reform would give more civilian control over the DOD is exactly what is not required. There is already micromanagement in the budget process that is well recognized by Congress as they are responsible for most of it. (24:7) There is also no evidence that efficiency would be improved though the CINCs would have more control in equipping their forces for their missions.

In summary, Hadley's reform has its merits to help the faults from The Flawed Organization and in improving Readiness. However, as seen, those merits are arguable and thus, it would not be appropriate to again change the budget process to accommodate a reform considered questionable by all the CINCs.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions from the analysis of Hadley's four reforms are the following:

1. His reforms never specifically address Interservice and Intraservice Rivalry, Overcontrol, or KAFCA.

2. Reform One - To Heal The Great Divorce - would only be marginally successful and only where internal reforms are called for, such as longer assignments, does Hadley provide a practical, executable recommendation.

3. Reform Two - Institute a just draft - is not necessary, nor is it practical, or executable as quality recruits are being acquired and even a fair draft would not be politically feasible in light of the tensions it would cause.

4. Reform Three - Reform the JCS - is necessary, practical, and has been implemented.

5. Reform Four - Direct mission funding - is practical but of limited value as there is no evidence it would contribute to efficiency and it may compromise the CINCs' primary operational responsibilities. It is not supported by the CINCs and therefore, not executable.

## CHAPTER FIVE

This chapter, based on the previous analysis, provides an overall conclusion on The Straw Giant, by Arthur T. Hadley, and presents recommendations on this book's use. Interim conclusions on Hadley's six themes and four reforms, which constitute the basis of this book analysis, were presented on pages 20 and 25 respectively and so they will not be detailed here.

### CONCLUSIONS

1. This book analysis of The Straw Giant does substantiate that Hadley's six themes exist, but it does not substantiate that all these themes represent significant faults or have been contributors to military failures.

2. Hadley does not present solutions to all the recurring faults these themes represent which tends to imply that Hadley himself may not consider all his themes significant.

3. Hadley's methods of supporting his themes, with predominately personal experiences and through interviews granted under anonymity (6:XVI), prevented him from providing an in-depth scholarly analysis. This makes it difficult to determine or accept the pervasiveness of his themes in the defense system.

4. The Straw Giant provides an objective historical overview of many of the problems that have troubled this country's defense system. Hadley's themes, coupled with his many examples, provide a good departure point for those interested in conducting a more thorough analysis of the defense system.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that The Straw Giant be placed on professional military education (PME) suggested reading lists.

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